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 1  ISIL is also known as The Islamic State, ISIS, IS, and Da ’ esh. For an account of the origin and 
development of the organisation, see for example  Loretta  Napoleoni ,  Islamic Phoenix: The Islamic State 
and the redrafting of the Middle East ( Seven Stories Press  2014 ) . 
 2  No common defi nition of the concept  ‘ foreign fi ghters ’ or  ‘ foreign terrorist fi ghters ’ exists. From a 
prevention and criminal justice point of view, this chapter mainly deals with societal responses to activ-
ities in connection with an individual ’ s voluntary affi liation with an insurgent group during an armed 
confl ict in a country other than the person ’ s habitual place of residence. In several widely disseminated 
works, Norwegian researchers Thomas Hegghammer and Peter Nesser have analysed various aspects 
of Islamic terrorism and the threat from different types of foreign fi ghters, see publications lists at 
 www.ffi .no . See also publications from The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at  www.icct.nl . 
 16 
 ‘ Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters ’ — De-Radicalisation 
and Inclusion vs Law Enforcement 
and Corrections in Denmark 
 J Ø RN  VESTERGAARD 
 I. The Dual Challenge with Responding 
to the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters 
 By the end of 2012, it had become clear to decision-makers in many countries and 
international organisations that the fl ow of outgoing travellers sympathising with 
insurgent groups in Syria called for prompt and resolute countermeasures. The 
phenomenon gave rise to grave worries that some returning individuals represent 
a perilous risk of terrorist activities in their home countries due to radicalisation, 
direct dealings with militant circles, and maybe even personal experience of bat-
tlefi eld participation. The rise of ISIL and the movement ’ s ability to recruit sup-
porters willing to engage actively in the armed fi ght for the proclaimed  ‘ Caliphate ’ 
accentuated the security concern further. 1 
 In the fi rst place, the phenomenon mainly called for measures more or less well 
suited for preventing individuals from  travelling to confl ict zones with the intention 
of joining militant or terrorist groups or organisations as associates, supporters or 
actual foreign fi ghters. 2 Due to the increasing military pressure on ISIL in Syria 
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 3  Ran Manual: Responses to returning foreign terrorist fi ghters and their families (Radicalisation 
Awareness Network, July 2017). 
 4  See for example the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA): 
 The Threat to Denmark from Foreign Fighters in Syria (December 2013);  Assessment of the Terror Threat 
to Denmark (April 2016). More reports in Danish and English are accessible at  www.pet.dk . 
and Iraq, a substantial number of such individuals are now expected to gradu-
ally  return from confl ict zones to Europe, which accentuates the need to develop 
adequate and differentiated policies and practices for receiving and dealing with 
them. 
 As will be demonstrated in this chapter, there is an inherent ambiguity in an 
overall policy, which at the same time promotes a harsh criminal justice response 
at the international and national levels and a multi-faceted social welfare reinte-
gration approach at the local level. 
 First, an account of the so-called Aarhus de-radicalisation and rehabilitation 
model will be presented. In addition, legislation recently introduced in Denmark 
will be discussed. Along the way, an overview and a critical analysis of legal instru-
ments recently introduced by the UN Security Council, the Council of Europe and 
the EU will be offered, too. 
 The analysis in the following is devoted to the schism caused by the ever more 
expansive criminalisation of preparatory acts and ancillary offences with no 
manifest or immediate proximity to actual terrorism. The efforts vested in de-
radicalisation and exit programmes in a municipal context can be eroded by the 
perpetual legislative adoption of repressive net-widening initiatives. 
 On a positive note, it deserves mentioning that a comprehensive approach to 
rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fi ghters 
seems to have gained substantial support among practitioners and experts. Vari-
ous agencies are actively advocating such schemes, see for example the elaborate 
manual presented by the Radicalisation Awareness Network, RAN,  Responses to 
returning foreign terrorist fi ghters and their families . 3 
 II. Denmark as an Actor in the Theatre 
of International Terrorism 
 Supplying nearly 20 departing jihadist supporters per one million inhabit-
ants, Denmark has more so-called foreign fi ghters than most other EU Member 
States, only slightly outscored by Belgium. At least 125 – 135 individuals have trav-
elled from Denmark to Syria/Iraq, according to the latest assessment from the 
 Danish  Security and Intelligence Service. Approximately half of the travellers 
have returned. More than one in every fi ve has been killed in the confl ict zone. 4 
 However, it seems that the fl ow of travellers has been declining since the middle 
of 2014. 
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 5  For a comprehensive account of Danish law, see  J ø rn  Vestergaard ,  ‘ Criminal law as an anchor-
age point for proactive antiterrorism legislation :  Denmark ’ in  Francesca  Galli and  Anne  Weyembergh 
(eds),  EU counter terrorism offences. What impact on national legislation and case law ? ( Institut d ’ Etudes 
Europ é ennes ,  É ditions de l ’ Universit é de Bruxelles ,  2012 )  169 – 94 . 
 6  Information regarding the programme has kindly been provided by Detective Inspector Thorleif 
Link. For a general introduction to the Danish approach to countering and prevention Extremism and 
radicalisation, see  Ann-Sophie  Hemmingsen ,  DIIS Report 2015:15 ( Dansk Institut for Internationale 
Studier  2015 ) , at  www.diis.dk . 
 7  Various materials on the Aarhus Model may be accessed from the internet. For an informative 
recent text and audio:  www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/15/485900076/how-a-danish-
town-helped-young-muslims-turn-away-from-isis . 
 8  The development of comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning for-
eign terrorist fi ghters has been urged, inter alia, by the Global Counterterrorism Forum in the so-called 
Hague-Marrakech Memorandum, in which various aspects of good practices to that effect are outlined. 
 9  On the Danish preventive measures and de-radicalisation strategies as applied under the Aarhus 
Model, see Professor of Psychology  Preben  Bertelsen ,  Panorama Insights into Asian and European 
Affairs ( 2015 ) vol  1 ,  241 – 53 . 
 The backdrop of the Danish foreign fi ghters phenomenon is a rather mixed com-
position of interrelated factors, but certain contributing components can easily be 
identifi ed, such as the  Jyllands-Posten Cartoon crisis, Denmark ’ s activist foreign 
policy including military engagement in the Middle East, and the generally rather 
harsh and polarised political debate regarding the integration of Muslim citizens 
into Danish society. A substantial number of criminal convictions of home-grown 
jihadists indicate the comprehensive scope of the aggregate problem. 5 
 III. The Aarhus De-Radicalisation 
and Rehabilitation Model 
 Strikingly, Denmark has been recognised globally for tackling de-radicalisation 
in a systematised fashion founded on a principle of inclusion. This particular 
mode of reintegration has become known as the Aarhus Model, a label referring 
to the programme implemented by the town of Aarhus, the country ’ s second larg-
est city with approximately 350,000 inhabitants. 6 The Aarhus Model is defi nitely 
paradigmatic and may very well serve as an inspiring example of best practice. 7 
A similar multi-agency approach is applied by several other Danish and European 
municipalities. 8 
 The philosophy behind the mentioned approach is induced from the notion that 
many radicalised youth are essentially bothered with existential misgivings. 9 Their 
extremist motivation is basically perceived as a kind of existentialistic pursuit for 
the opportunity to live a good and decent life on par with others. Consequently, 
the better response to their rebellion is not to be found in further stigmatisation 
and exclusion, but in targeted individual assistance for the purpose of developing 
adequate life skills in order to become part of or re-enter ordinary society in a 
260 Jørn Vestergaard
 10  The so-called SSP-network ( s chool,  s ocial welfare,  p olice). 
 11  PET, ie  Politiets Efterretningstjeneste . 
 12  FE, ie  Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste . 
 13  Parliament ’ s Act No 1571, 2015. After the Copenhagen killings at the venue  ‘ Krudtt ø nden ’ (The 
Powder Barrel) and the Synagogue in February 2015, the Government presented an action plan con-
cerning prevention of radicalisation and extremism, including prevention of radicalisation related to 
participation in armed confl ict abroad. The plan involved a controversial proposal to authorise the 
military intelligence service to monitor Danish citizens outside of Denmark without a court warrant. 
Due to substantial criticism by academics and others, judicial oversight was granted, but the legislative 
requirements for intervention remained weak. 
non-violent manner and to exercise meaningful citizenship. All along, any citizen ’ s 
fundamental rights regarding personal political conviction and religious faith 
should be recognised and respected. In the Danish setting, the Aarhus programme 
is mostly an extension of a general, early intervention crime prevention scheme 
that has been applied for more than 30 years, including inter-agency information 
sharing and coordinated action involving the school system, the social welfare sys-
tem and the local police. 10 
 The Aarhus police have set up a clearinghouse, a hotspot called the Info House 
that handles information regarding signs of radicalisation from worried family 
members, teachers, social workers and ordinary citizens. In addition, the  Danish 
Security and Intelligence Service 11 is an important driver in the reintegration 
scheme by supplying the local police with dossiers of individuals considered at 
risk. The person concerned is summoned for a talk, screening, visitation, risk 
assessment, etc. Depending on the individual circumstances, a tailored and prefer-
ably proportionate intervention will be offered, such as counselling, healthcare, 
assistance with education, employment, accommodation, a programme to exit 
from extremist circles, and linking up with a trained mentor. If no further action 
is needed, the intelligence service will just continue to keep a watchful eye on 
the individual concerned. It has actually been reported that some returnees have 
come back fundamentally disillusioned with the cause of ISIL, or other insurgent 
groups, after having witnessed mismanagement or even repulsive atrocities. Such 
individuals are obvious targets for rehabilitation programmes such as the one 
implemented by the Aarhus authorities. 
 Not anybody at risk of radicalisation is considered eligible for admission to the 
programme. According to offi cial sources, an individual will only get help to fi nd a 
way back to society if he or she has not committed any serious offences. If there is 
reason to believe that the person has done something criminal, the matter will be 
investigated and eventually prosecuted, depending on suffi cient evidence to build 
a case on. Other things being equal, the prospect for such legal action naturally 
improves in light of the many current initiatives in order to strengthen intelligence 
and investigation tools, eg due to the focus on collection and exchange of digital 
evidence. In particular, it might bring added value that surveillance and intercep-
tion of Danish citizens abroad by the Danish Intelligence Service 12 has recently 
been authorised. 13 
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 14  See TfK 2009.762  Ø ( Tidsskrift for Kriminalret , a regular court reporter,  Ø =  Ø stre Landsret , ie The 
Eastern High Court). 
 15  Penal Code (PC) Sections 114 ff. The enactment in 2002 of amended criminal provisions by 
the fi rst antiterrorism package refl ected a transposition of the obligations due to Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the UN 1999 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the EU Framework 
Decision on Combatting Terrorism 2002/475/JHA. The 2006 adoption of the second antiterrorism 
package basically implemented obligations stipulated by the Council of Europe ’ s 2005 Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism, later to be followed up by the 2008 amendment of the 2002 Framework 
Decision. See J ø rn Vestergaard (n 5 above). 
 Obviously, it makes a lot of sense that a returnee who has been apprehended 
while deliberately preparing a terrorist attack should not be granted impunity in 
exchange for enrolment in a programme for rehabilitation and reintegration. The 
following case can serve as illustration: 
 Glasvej case : In 2008, two young males were convicted of attempt to commit a 
terrorist act. The principal perpetrator had returned from an al-Qaeda training 
camp in Waziristan bringing with him an elaborate bomb manual. Together they 
then produced and tested a small amount of TATP (triacetone triperoxide), an 
explosive intended as a component in a so far unspecifi ed terror attack. They were 
not included in the reintegration programme but sentenced to 12 and 7 years ’ 
imprisonment, respectively. 14 
 Still, it must give cause for concern if a law enforcement approach is rigidly applied 
in minor cases involving only preparatory offences with only a remote nexus to 
actual terrorism, at least if the perpetrator is prepared to abandon violent extrem-
ism and reach out for reintegration. This concern should be taken into account 
even more as some recent initiatives imply further criminalisation of activities 
not manifestly representing a genuinely substantiated risk of facilitating terrorism. 
 IV. Outline of Danish Criminal Law Concerning 
Terrorism and Foreign Fighters 
 While the Aarhus rehabilitation model has attracted widespread appraisal, and as 
more or less similar schemes have been adapted in other municipalities, the atten-
tion by a majority of politicians in the Danish Parliament has simultaneously been 
determinedly focused on the application of punitive measures. 
 Under Danish criminal law, there is no general ban on participating in armed 
confl ict abroad. However, such activities might very well be covered by various 
criminal provisions, naturally depending on the specifi c circumstances. Thus, 
a number of the antiterrorism provisions could be highly relevant in certain 
instances. 15 Evidentially, violence, killings, hostage-taking, sexual assaults, and 
other serious offences are punishable in accordance with the common provisions 
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 16  Cf PC Section 114 c (3), and PC Section 114 d (3). The fi rst mentioned articles also covers recruit-
ing somebody to fi nance or to facilitate the fi nancing of terrorism. These provisions were amended due 
to a more comprehensive legislative initiative aiming at complying with the then anticipated require-
ments of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) ETS No 196. 
 However, said Convention does not call for  ‘ passive recruitment ’ to be criminalised, a matter which is 
now dealt with by the Additional 2015 Protocol to the Convention, which transposes the obligations 
under Security Council Resolution 2178, S/RES/2178 adopted the 24.09.2014 under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, see later. 
 17  Both defendants were convicted of attempted violation of PC Section 114 d (3), cf U 2014.3017 
V (weekly court reports published in  Ugeskrift for Retsv æ sen ). 
 18  See the landmark judgment UfR 2009.1453 H, ie the so-called  ‘ Fighters + Lovers ’ case. ( Ugeskrift 
for Retsv æ sen , a weekly court reporter, H =  H ø jesteret , ie the Supreme Court). Recently, the Eastern 
to that effect, granted that such acts are covered by jurisdictional rules and are 
not defi ned as lawful due to a combatant ’ s privilege under International Humani-
tarian Law (IHL). Obviously, the overriding concern regarding bringing foreign 
fi ghters to justice would be to ensure that they do not get away with impunity if 
they have participated in any kind of atrocities, including acts of terrorism. How-
ever, in such instances, the burden of proof is an onerous one for the prosecutor, 
as suffi cient evidence concerning criminal activities would typically be lacking, 
partly due to the diffi culties in obtaining relevant information regarding an insur-
gent group ’ s activities in remote and chaotic confl ict zones, and partly due to the 
need to protect sources and collaborators and to the secrecy regarding intelligence 
technicalities and modalities. 
 In 2002, the Penal Code (PC) was amended to include provisions concerning 
actual terrorist acts, fi nancing or otherwise facilitating terrorism. In 2006, the 
 Parliament criminalised recruiting and training for terrorism purposes in order 
to pave the ground for ratifying the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism. Concurrently, being recruited or receiving training for terrorism 
 purposes was criminalised, too. 16 The article regarding reception of training has 
been applied in the following case: 
 Al-Shabaab training camp : In 2014, two brothers of Somalian origin and resi-
dents of Aarhus were convicted of attempt to receive training for terrorism and 
both sentenced to two years ’ imprisonment. The elder brother had spent a couple 
of weeks in an al-Shabaab camp with the intention of receive training, but it was 
uncertain whether he had succeeded. The other had supported him fi nancially 
and otherwise. 17 
 No information is publicly available with regard to the risk assessment concern-
ing the two defendants. Nevertheless, the outcome of the case represents a signifi -
cant contrast to the alternative reintegration scheme, in particular considering the 
fact that the conviction related to an only attempted perpetration, and that the 
offender had actually made an effort to return home expediently. 
 Under Danish criminal law, the antiterrorism provisions in the Penal Code 
are applicable even in instances where members of a rebel group or organisa-
tion commit acts of terrorism in the context of an armed confl ict. This has been 
established by several judgments. 18 Except for legislation specifi cally covering 
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High Court upheld a municipal court judgment fi nding the Penal Code ’ s antiterrorism provisions 
applicable by rejecting the argument that since the al-Nusra Front is responsible for killings of civilians 
in Syria, the organisation ’ s participation in armed confl ict is not to be considered legitimate according 
to International Humanitarian Law, Frederiksberg Municipal Court, case no 7156/2014, Eastern High 
Court, Section 15, case no S-3475-14. Regarding the rating of the PKK as a terrorist organisation in 
various cases concerning the fi nancing of terrorism, see U 2014.1540 H (ROJ TV) and Eastern High 
Court judgment of 08.06.2016, case nos S-3006-14 and S-616-15. 
 19  Cf PC Section 102 (1) and (2)(1). Further, PC Section 101 criminalises preparation for assistance 
to the enemy for the purpose of  ‘ war, occupation or other hostilities ’ , so-called fi fth column activities. 
terrorism offences and a separate statute concerning genocide, there are no 
 particular provisions targeting international crimes. Moreover, there is no legal 
reservation preventing courts from adjudicating on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity under antiterrorism provisions. 
 By the end of 2015, an article regarding treacherous participation in armed con-
fl ict in alliance with an enemy of Denmark was introduced. In the Spring of 2016, 
prohibitions regarding travelling to or staying in certain areas where armed con-
fl ict is taking place, as well as regarding facilitating such travelling, were inserted 
in the Penal Code, as will be explained in more detail below. 
 V. Updating the Treason Provisions 
 For quite some time after the beginning of the fl ow of foreign fi ghters to Syria, the 
legal status of Danish citizens and foreign residents of Denmark travelling to the 
confl ict zone was inconclusive. 
 In October 2014, Denmark once again engaged in armed confl ict in the  Middle 
East. Parliament decided to join the alliance including Iraq and the US in the armed 
confl ict with ISIL by deploying seven F-16 fi ghter planes and supplementary mili-
tary manpower in order to join the alliance with the Iraqi State by participating 
in offensive air strikes against ISIL targets in Iraq. At least as from that moment, 
Denmark had become part of the non-international armed confl ict between ISIL 
and a number of states. 
 Despite the availability of a vast set of antiterrorism provisions in the Penal 
Code, a majority in Parliament regarded it as compelling to ensure that affi liation 
with an armed group of adversaries in an armed confl ict involving Denmark shall 
be punishable as treason. 
 For decades, the Penal Code has featured an article criminalising  ‘ recruiting for 
or being in the service of belligerent or occupying enemy or armed forces or being 
in connection with such entities operating in military or police corps or similar 
corps or organisations ’ . 19 In everyday speech, this article was referred to as  ‘ the 
treason article ’ . Representatives for the parliamentary parties in opposition to the 
then Social Democratic-led Government called for indictments under this article 
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 20  A detailed account of the debate can be read in Danish in the author ’ s contribution to the 
 publication  Peter  Vedel Kessing and  Andreas  Laursen (eds),  Robust mandat ( DJ Ø F  2016 )  371 – 418 . 
 21  The Permanent Penal Committee ’ s report 1556, 2015  ‘ opinion on certain matters regarding 
 participation in and recruitment for armed confl icts abroad that the State of Denmark is a party 
to ’ ( ‘ Straffelovr å dets udtalelse om visse sp ø rgsm å l vedr ø rende deltagelse i og hvervning til v æ bnede 
 konfl ikter i udlandet, som den danske stat er part i ’ ). 
 22  Venstre — The Liberal Party of Denmark,  ‘ liberal ’ as in  ‘ liberalism ’ . 
 23  Parliament ’ s Act No 1880, 29.12.2015 amending the Penal Code ( ‘ Tilslutning til fjendtlig 
 styrke ’ — Affi liation with an enemy force), adopted by Parliament 15.12.2015. 
of foreign fi ghters affi liated with Islamic groups in Syria. When politicians chal-
lenged the administration in power by raising questions in Parliament regarding 
this matter, the response on the part of the Ministry of Justice was hesitant and 
offered only vague indications with regard to the possible application of the law. 20 
 After having entered the theatre of armed confl ict in the Middle East, it became 
evident that there was a pressing demand for a thorough examination of the scope 
of existing legislation and the possible need for amendments. Therefore, after quite 
a lot of political commotion, initiatives were taken to introduce a new offence to 
this effect. It became the responsibility for the Permanent Penal Committee under 
the Ministry of Justice to produce an analysis and to present suitable recommen-
dations pertaining to bringing enemy foreign fi ghters to justice. The Committee ’ s 
report to that effect was published in June 2015. 21 
 The Permanent Penal Committee ’ s point of departure for its considerations 
concerning the aim of criminalising participation in and recruitment for armed 
confl icts abroad was primarily the need to counter the risk posed by returning 
foreign fi ghters, but also a desire to curtail the extent and seriousness of armed 
confl icts. However, with regard to confl icts directly involving Denmark, the main 
argument for criminalisation is that a particular bond of loyalty binds (1)  Danish 
citizens, regardless of residence or possible double citizenship, (2) stateless 
individuals, and (3) foreign citizens residing in Denmark. Such persons enjoy 
Danish jurisdiction and protection, which — in accordance with international 
law — corresponds with an obligation not to fi ght for the enemy in an armed con-
fl ict. Thus, the Committee recommended a specifi c criminalisation of affi liating 
with enemy forces. 
 In the summer of 2015, the Centre-Left lost a general election and a new 
 Cabinet was formed by one of the former opposition parties. 22 After taking offi ce, 
the new Minister of Justice, Mr S ø ren Pind, endorsed the recommendation from 
the Committee and presented a Bill to that effect to Parliament. Without much 
public attention, the proposed legislation was adopted in December 2015. 23 The 
new article in the Penal Code has the following wording: 
 PC Section 101 a. Anyone who has Danish citizenship or residence in the State of 
 Denmark and who during an armed confl ict involving as a party the State of  Denmark, 
is affi liated with an armed force belonging to a party fi ghting against the State of 
 Denmark, is  punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years. Under especially aggravat-
ing circumstances, the punishment is imprisonment of up to life. In particular, instances 
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 24  With regard to non-international armed confl icts, the  ‘ point of departure ’ is taken in Common 
Article 3, which has a wider scope of application than Additional Protocol II. 
where someone has participated in armed combat shall be considered aggravating 
circumstances. 
 Subsection 2. Anyone who under circumstances as stipulated in Subsection 1 recruits 
somebody who has Danish citizenship or residence in the State of Denmark for an armed 
force, or who publicly incites such a person to affi liate with enemy forces in such confl icts 
shall be punished by imprisonment up to 10 years. Under especially aggravating cir-
cumstances, the punishment is imprisonment of up to 16 years. In particular, instances 
where violations of a systematic or organised character are in question shall be consid-
ered aggravating circumstances. 
 No formalised procedure exists for determining whether Denmark is participat-
ing in an  ‘ armed confl ict ’ or how the particular character of such a confl ict should 
be assessed in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. In a specifi c 
instance, the issue might, or might not, have been clarifi ed by Parliament when 
consenting to the use of armed force. In the  travaux pr é paratoires to the newly 
introduced treason article, it is emphasised that its application in a specifi c case 
depends on a solid basis for presupposing that Denmark is taking part in an armed 
confl ict. 24 Liability under said article requires a criminal intent with regard to the 
factual circumstances justifying the legal assessment of the situation as an armed 
confl ict. 
 Hereafter, the mere  affi liation with the forces of an adversary will be suffi cient 
basis for criminal liability. It is not a legal requirement that the person has partici-
pated in actual combat or, as a member of enemy forces, has aided these in other 
ways. Any type of armed confl ict involving Danish military units is covered, no 
matter whether it takes place near or far from Danish territory. It does not matter 
whether the adversary party is fi ghting directly against Danish combat forces or 
against a state to which Denmark is an ally. Neither is it relevant whether the unit 
with which the person is affi liated is specifi cally fi ghting Danish forces. 
 The amended article includes any function in a hostile armed force. It is not a con-
dition for criminal liability that the person ’ s purpose for joining the enemy was an 
intention to participate in active combat, or that he/she actually does so. Affi liation 
by serving in supportive operations is also prohibited, even if these merely involve 
medical or religious services. It also does not matter whether the person has status as 
a combatant and thus is a legitimate target according to International Humanitarian 
Law. The offence is completed when an individual has joined an enemy unit or has 
made an agreement to that effect with a representative for the enemy, and it does not 
matter whether the person has been located in a confl ict area at all. 
 Employment in an enemy state ’ s civil administration or other affi liation with 
entities not included in its armed forces is not considered a criminal offence. Like-
wise, affi liation with an insurgent group ’ s branches responsible for social welfare, 
health or education issues is not an offence if such units are structurally segregated 
from the group ’ s armed forces. 
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 25  The analysis in the present contribution draws extensively on the work of  Sandra  Kraehenmann , 
 Foreign Fighters under International Law ( Briefi ng No 7, Geneva Academy of International Humani-
tarian Law and Human Rights, October  2014 )  20 , where comprehensive reference to the literature is 
provided. 
 26  Additional Protocol II, Art 6(5) only has binding effect in relation to the territorial state. Neither 
Iraq, Syria nor the USA have ratifi ed AP II. However, the International Red Cross regards this rule as an 
expression of international customary law. 
 At sentencing, a substantial risk of execution or other serious consequences of 
attempted deserting or escaping from the group may be considered a mitigating 
or exonerating factor. 
 Depending on the concrete circumstances of the individual case, criminal liabil-
ity under the amended treason article can be incurred concurrently with liability 
under antiterrorism provisions, eg regarding facilitation of or training for terror-
ism purposes. 
 Adoption of the new treason article was not really required in order to bring 
foreign fi ghters to justice, as already existing provisions were absolutely suffi cient 
to serve that purpose, given that incriminating evidence was solid enough. How-
ever, it should not be underestimated that introducing the amended article might 
have been appropriate in order to satisfy a fundamental public and political desire 
for denouncing the kind of treacherous activities it covers. As a symbolic expres-
sion of societal dissociation from such behaviour, the article is fairly well suited to 
serve a symbolic function by sending a rather clear and adequate message. 
 It is a quite different question whether such specifi c kind of criminalisation 
can be expected to provide any added value to the prevention of travel to confl ict 
zones to join ISIL or other insurgent groups or organisations. For individuals who 
are inspired or aroused by a desire to do so, such legislative initiatives hardly have 
a persuasive infl uence, not to speak of a deterrent impact. Still, it cannot be com-
pletely denied that there might be some marginal positive preventive effect of the 
legislative step. Thus, the treason article could serve as a kind of bottom plug in 
relation to the overall and more comprehensive undertaking to prevent radicali-
sation and travel to specifi c confl ict zones. At least, the introduction of the new 
article has resulted in a heightened degree of clarity as to of the state of the law. 
 On the other hand, criminalisation in order to enforce the loyalty obligation 
might be counterproductive in relation to the aim of the part of International 
Humanitarian Law that is intended to provide an incentive for members of armed 
forces to comply with the laws of war, including in relation to protection of civil-
ians. If there is a risk of serious repercussions from the very affi liation with enemy 
forces, it might not be of essential importance that there is also a prospect of liabil-
ity for assaulting civilians or butchering prisoners  hors de combat . 25 
 Under humanitarian law, there is a presumption that the territorial state after 
cessation of a non-international armed confl ict in the widest possible manner 
offers amnesty to members of non-state groups who have not committed war 
crimes or other international crimes. 26 The aim of this recommendation is pre-
cisely to strengthen the impulse to respect standards of behaviour equivalent to 
those prescribed for combatants. Under a similar rationale, it could be argued that 
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 27  For discussions of criteria and procedures concerning the treatment of insurgents who have 
respected the principles of IHL, including the possibility of amnesty, annulment of criminal liability, 
or leniency in sentencing with regard to the actual participation in armed confl ict, see for example 
 Francois  Bugnion ( 2003 )  Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law  167 – 98 ;  Marco  Sass ò li ,  Essays 
in Honour of Yoram Dienstein ( Martinus Nijhoff  2007 )  256 ;  Jonathan  Somer ,  ‘ Jungle justice: passing 
sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international armed confl ict ’  89  International Review of 
the Red Cross No 867 ( September 2007 )  655 – 90 ;  Ezequiel  Heffes and  Marcos  D Kotlik ,  ‘ Special agree-
ments as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-international confl icts: An inquiry into 
the governing legal regime ’ ,  96  International Review of the Red Cross ( December 2014 )  1195 – 224 . 
 28  For a sophisticated analysis of this problem, see  Michael  Scharf ,  ‘ Defi ning Terrorism as the Peace-
time Equivalent of War Crimes :  Problems and Prospects ’ ( 2004 )  Faculty Publications , Paper 229, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
 29  This has been established inter alia in  ECtHR ,  16.09.2014 ,  Hassan v UK ( Application 
no 29750/09 ) . See also  Helen  Duffy ,  The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law 
( Cambridge University Press  2005 ) ch 7;  Alex  Conte ,  ‘ An Old Question in a New Context :  Do States 
Have to Comply with Human Rights When Countering the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters ? ’ ( EJIL: 
Talk! , 19.03.2015):  www.ejiltalk.org/an-old-question-in-a-new-context-do-states-have-to-comply-
with-human-rights-when-countering-the-phenomenon-of-foreign-fi ghters/ , accessed  20.11.2016 ; 
Council of Europe,  Guidelines on human rights and the fi ght against terrorism (adopted by the 
 Committee of Ministers at its 804th meeting, 11.07.2002). 
 particular criminalisation should be avoided in relation to individuals travelling 
abroad to participate in armed confl ict, even if such activities involve betraying your 
home country. 27 However, it would probably be na ï ve to overstate expectations 
regarding the rationality of calculations made by an individual who is already part 
of enemy forces. Moreover, it cannot be denied that it could be perceived as grossly 
provocative if that type of turning against your own country were to be endorsed. 28 
 In any case, it amounts to an erosion of the principles underlying IHL, if a gov-
ernment categorically treats insurgents as common criminals or terrorists. Such a 
policy poses the risk of depriving civilians and captured individuals of the protec-
tion established under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It should 
further be remembered, that international human rights are applicable during 
armed confl ict, too, although with certain modifi cations. 29 
 For returning foreign fi ghters without a history of participation in active com-
bat, it would no doubt be the rational option to offer enrolment in a reintegration 
programme like the one practised under the Aarhus model, assuming that the 
individual in the specifi c instance demonstrates sincere intentions to renounce 
militant activities. It would be counterproductive to insist on criminal liability 
and imposition of an unconditional imprisonment sentence for violation of a very 
wide-reaching treason article. 
 VI. Amending the Passport Code 
and the Foreigners Act 
 After the Paris attacks and the Copenhagen shootings in early 2015, the Danish 
Passport Code was amended in order to authorise the police to deny issuing and 
to revoke previously issued passports, and to order a travel ban if there is  ‘ reason 
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 30  Passport Code Section 2 (1)(4), implemented by Parliament ’ s Act No 176, 2015. 
 31  Passport Code Section 5 (1), cf Section 2 b (1). 
 32  Foreigners Act Section 21 b (1). 
 33  Security Council Resolution 2170 S/RES/2014 adopted the 15.08.2014 and Security Council 
Resolution 2178 (n 16 above). 
 34  Security Council Resolution 1373 S/RES/2001 adopted 28.09.2001 under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. The resolution also obligated all states to freeze funds and other fi nancial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the 
to assume ’ that an individual  ‘ has an intention to participate abroad in activities 
that could imply or enhance a danger for the security of the Danish State or the 
security of other States, or a substantial threat against the public order ’ , ie a secu-
rity risk of engaging in violence upon return. 30 A decision to this effect may be 
accompanied by a time-limited prohibition on leaving the country. A violation of 
such an injunction is punishable by fi ne or imprisonment up to two years. 31 
 Concurrently with the introduction of the new passport rules, the Foreigners 
Act was amended in order to authorise the revocation of a residence permit under 
criteria basically equivalent to those in the Passport Code. 32 
 The threshold regarding suspicion under these newly introduced articles is sig-
nifi cantly lower than those associated with criminal provisions under the Penal 
Code. The manifest intention behind this approach is to facilitate the application 
of the rules in instances where it would be diffi cult to satisfy the burden of proof 
in a criminal case regarding violation of the prohibition on being recruited for 
the purpose of terrorism. The scheme raises a number of so far unresolved ques-
tions regarding substantive criteria and evidentiary requirements. According to the 
 travaux pr é paratoires , information that an individual is staying in a confl ict zone 
without a creditable objective will ordinarily be suffi cient to meet the stipulated 
standard of proof. A number of decisions have now been made, and the course is 
apparently somewhat meandering. Particular attention has been attracted by a case 
regarding revocation of a passport belonging to a Danish-Kurdish woman who 
had travelled to Iraq several times, allegedly in order to join Peshmerga forces that 
are known to be operating side by side with allied forces in the fi ght against ISIL. 
 VII. The UN Security Council — Adopting 
Resolutions 2170 and 2178 (2014) 
 In 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 2170 and 2178 directed 
at what were labelled  foreign terrorist fi ghters . 33 The two instruments enhance the 
sweeping obligations imposed on all states by Resolution 1373 (2001), whereby 
the Council promptly followed up on the 9/11 attacks by placing itself in the posi-
tion as international law-maker. Basically, Resolution 1373 stated a mandatory 
requirement concerning criminalising the fi nancing, planning, preparation, per-
petration or supporting of terrorist acts, etc. 34 It also established an obligation 
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commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and 
of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities. It further-
more called upon all states to intensify and accelerate the exchange of information and to cooperate on 
administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts and take action against 
perpetrators of such acts, etc. The resolution provided no defi nition of terrorist acts. There is a vast 
amount of academic analysis of Resolution 1373. 
 35  Pursuant to Article 6(b) and (c), the Member States ’ obligation to criminalise and bring to justice 
also covers fi nancing and facilitating activities mentioned under (a). 
to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or 
persons involved in terrorist acts, including an obligation to suppress recruitment 
of members of terrorist groups. Furthermore, by adopting Resolution 1373 the 
Security Council decided that all states shall prevent the movement of terrorists or 
terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity 
papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeit-
ing, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents. Still, Reso-
lution 1373 did not include a specifi c obligation to criminalise travelling to areas 
where terrorist groups are involved in armed confl ict. 
 When adopting Resolution 2170 (2014), the Security Council called upon all 
Member States to take national measures to suppress the fl ow of foreign terror-
ist fi ghters to — and bring to justice foreign terrorist fi ghters of — ISIL, ANF and 
all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with al-Qaeda. 
The Council further reiterated the obligations to prevent the movement of ter-
rorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls, to expeditiously exchange 
information, and to improve cooperation among competent authorities to pre-
vent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, 
etc. Member States were encouraged to engage with those within their territories 
at risk of recruitment and violent radicalisation to discourage travel to Syria and 
Iraq for the purposes of supporting or fi ghting for terrorists. 
 The Member States ’ obligations were then further broadened by the adoption of 
Resolution 2178 (2014). This instrument instructs Member States to criminalise 
outward travelling aimed at activities related to terrorism,  ‘ including in connec-
tion with armed confl ict ’ . Resolution 2178 rounds up the primary target group in 
quite broad terms, and it is not solely addressing the situation in Syria and Iraq. 
 The basic obligation in Resolution 2178 is stipulated in Article 6, according to 
which the Security Council: 
 decides that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish 
 serious criminal offenses suffi cient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in 
a manner duly refl ecting the seriousness of the offense:
 (a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of 
residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from 
their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the 
purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist 
acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with 
armed confl ict. 35 
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 36  For a thorough account, see Sandra Kraehenmann,  Foreign Fighters under International Law 
(n 25 above), p 19 f and p 61 ff. 
 37  Under IHL, the concept of terrorism is tied to the prohibition on  ‘ measures of intimidation or 
terrorism ’ directed at civilians or other protected persons. The concept is intimately connected to the 
principle of distinction, according to which the protection of civilians against the impact of belliger-
ent activities depends on the ability to distinguish them from combatants. See Geneva Convention IV 
Art 33, Protocol I Art 51(2), Protocol II Art 4(2)(d), and Art 13(2). 
 38  See for example conventions regarding hostage taking Art 26(5), terror-bombing Art 19(2), 
terror-fi nancing Art 2, nuclear terrorism Art 4(2). 
 Further, Member States are urged to employ evidence-based traveller risk assess-
ment and screening procedures including collection and analysis of travel data, 
and they are called upon to cooperate, including by preventing the radicalisation to 
terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fi ghters, preventing foreign terrorist 
fi ghters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing fi nancial support 
to foreign terrorist fi ghters, and developing and implementing prosecution, reha-
bilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fi ghters. 
 Many legal experts have criticised Resolution 2178 for contributing to blur 
the distinction between war crimes and terrorism beyond the sphere of armed 
confl ict, as Member States are now under an obligation to criminalise certain 
activities as participation in terrorist acts or terrorist training despite the fact 
that the aim is to prevent conduct exercised in relation to armed confl ict. This 
blending is unfortunate, because the purpose of and the content of International 
Humanitarian Law regarding the use of force and rules under public international 
law regarding preventing and combatting terrorism in peacetime, respectively, are 
basically different. 36 
 Under International Humanitarian Law, certain forms of resorting to use of 
force are approved in the course of an armed confl ict, while others are prohibited, 
in an effort to reduce loss of human lives and human suffering caused by wanton 
display of violence and other excesses, including acts of terror directed against 
civilians. 37 The rules to this effect are binding upon all parties in international as 
well as non-international armed confl icts. 
 International agreements concerning the prevention and combat of terror-
ism in peacetime do not rely on a distinction between lawful and illegal use of 
force. Their aim is to obligate states to engage in international cooperation with 
regard to certain modes of qualifi ed violence during peacetime by means of rules 
regarding criminalisation, universal jurisdiction, prosecution, mutual legal aid, 
etc. In accordance with such international agreements, contracting parties must 
criminalise activity that is, in some instances, lawful under IHL, including attacks 
against a government ’ s or an adversary rebel group ’ s armed forces during a non-
international armed confl ict. Normally, such instruments have a caveat stipulating 
that they are not applicable with regard to the activities of armed forces during an 
armed confl ict. 38 The prevailing opinion in academic literature is that this reserva-
tion covers both international and non-international armed confl icts. Besides, the 
global  ‘ sectorial ’ antiterrorism conventions do not encompass any obligation to 
criminalise recruitment or training for terrorism. 
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 39  The global sanctions regime against al-Qaeda et al was established by Security Council Reso-
lution 1390 of 16.01.2002 that built on Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15.10.1999 and most 
recently has been maintained by Resolution 2161 of 17.06.2014. In Resolutions 2170 and 2178, it is 
observed that  foreign terrorist fi ghters and persons who fi nance or otherwise facilitates such individuals ’ 
travel or subsequent activities can be included in the sanctions list, which actually has happened for 
individuals affi liated with al-Nusra or ISIL. To follow up on Resolution 1373, the EU has established 
an autonomous sanctions regime. The academic literature on blacklisting and terrorist lists is abun-
dant. For a contribution by this author, see  ‘ Terror Financing — Asset Freezing, Human Rights and the 
 European Legal Order ’ ( 2011 )  2  New Journal of European Criminal Law  175 – 200 . 
 40  An example regarding a reservation in national criminal law modifying the application of antiter-
rorism legislation on activities of armed forces during an armed confl ict can be found in the Belgian 
Criminal Code Section 141 bis ( ‘ ne s ’ applique pas aux activit é s des forces arm é es en p é riode de confl it 
arm é , tels que d é fi nis et r é gis par le droit international humanitaire ’ ). For an account of Belgian law, see 
 Anne  Weyembergh and  Celine  Cocq  ‘ Belgium ’ in  K  Roach (eds),  Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law 
( Cambridge University Press  2015 )  234 – 68 . 
 41  An exception is found in the 1973 Convention on crimes against internationally protected 
persons. 
 42  See the Council Framework Decision of 13.06.2002 on Combating Terrorism [2002] OJ L164/3, 
Recital 11. 
 43  See Council of Europe, Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) CETS 196, Art 26(5). 
The Convention has been ratifi ed by 37 Member States; however not by Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, San Marino, Switzerland, or the UK. It was signed by the EU 
on 22.10.2015. 
 In a series of resolutions adopted in the wake of 9/11, the Security Council has 
blended the international regulation concerning the prevention of terrorism in 
peacetime and the governing of armed confl icts. Thus, the sanctions regime con-
cerning al-Qaeda and affi liated entities and individuals includes operators both 
engaged in armed confl ict and directly or indirectly involved in terrorism. 39 In the 
wide-reaching Resolution 1373, there is no caveat regarding armed confl icts. Con-
sequently, neither Denmark nor a number of other states have made exceptions 
when implementing this resolution into domestic criminal law. 40 Resolution 2178 
regarding foreign terrorist fi ghters is tailored to the same pattern and is explicitly 
directed towards  ‘ terrorist acts and participation in armed confl icts ’ . Admittedly, 
the resolution obliges states to implement their duties under the instrument in 
accordance with IHL, but this does not imply any limitation with regard to its 
application in situations including war crimes, eg hostage taking, torturing cap-
tives, recruiting child soldiers, grave assaulting of non-combatants, direct attacks 
on civilians, or actual terrorist acts. 
 Furthermore, Resolution 2178 does not offer any defi nition of terrorism, but 
solely refers to previously adopted  ‘ sectorial ’ conventions regarding hijacking, hos-
tage taking, terror-bombing, fi nancing of terrorism, etc. In accordance with the 
above-mentioned tradition, most of these instruments do not cover acts com-
mitted during armed confl ict. 41 Consequently, the reference to International 
Humanitarian Law contributes to substantial uncertainty as to the reach of the 
resolution ’ s obligations and their compatibility with the principle of legality and 
otherwise established requirements regarding legal certainty and predictability. 
 In addition, the EU Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism 42 and the 
Council of Europe 2005 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 43 exclude 
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 44  Regarding assaults on individuals, who do not participate in hostilities, see the enumeration 
in Common Article 3, which is assumed to be an expression of customary international law. See 
also Additional Protocol II Art 4. See further the more extensive codifi cations in the Rome Statute 
Art 8(2)(c) and the explanatory Elements of Crimes; the ICTR Statute Art 4; the SCLS Statute 
Art 3. The leading precedent regarding jurisdiction  ratione materiae with respect to international 
crimes committed in the course of non-international armed confl icts is ICTY  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadi ć , 
 IT-94-1-A , Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 02.10.1995. See also icrc.org/customary-ihl: Rule 156, 
 Defi nition of War Crimes . 
the actions of armed forces during periods of armed confl ict from the obligations 
imposed on Member States. 
 By adopting resolutions drafted on the kind of template utilised for the issu-
ing of Resolution 1373 and Resolution 2178, all members and affi liates of certain 
rebel groups are designated as participants in terrorism. This mode of legislating is 
rather excessive in comparison with the regulation under International Humani-
tarian Law. One consequence is that states have become under an obligation to 
criminalise attacks on military targets, despite such belligerent actions being 
legitimate under IHL. Furthermore, it leads to an extensive criminalisation of acts 
related to participation in armed confl ict, since the mere acquisition of knowledge 
and skills concerning handling of weapons and explosives when in the company 
of a rebel group participating in armed confl ict might be interpreted as receiving 
training for terrorism. 
 Most international antiterrorism agreements do not apply during armed con-
fl ict. Neither do they entail obstacles under national criminal law to defi ning vari-
ous acts committed in such situations as terrorism or crimes related to terrorism. 
Thus, in many jurisdictions, international obligations regarding the prevention 
and combat of terrorism committed in connection with an armed confl ict have 
been implemented by amending common antiterrorism provisions without any 
distinction between the activities that are prohibited under IHL and those that 
are not. The immediate impact of such indiscriminate legal action is to establish 
a protruded legal shield criminalising a broad range of ancillary activities such as 
fi nancing of, recruiting for, training for terrorism, etc. 
 Under domestic criminal law, there are no legal barriers to criminalising the 
act of joining an insurgent group or organisation, even though such doings are 
not as such prohibited under the laws of armed confl ict, either for nationals or for 
foreigners. 
 Prosecuting members and supporters of rebel groups under antiterrorism leg-
islation even blurs the fact that actual terrorist acts affecting civilians during a 
non-international armed confl ict constitute a violation of IHL. Such acts might 
be covered by the rules regarding war crimes or crimes against humanity under 
international and possibly under domestic criminal law. 44 As a result, the rhetoric 
of Resolution 2178 is suited to send a misguided signal and to give rise to falla-
cious notions that might contribute to the glorifi cation of individuals and move-
ments, which consider terrorism to be a legitimate or plainly admirable means to 
be deployed in an ideologically or politically tainted struggle. 
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 45  See likewise former Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Professor 
 Martin Scheinin at  www.justsecurity.org . See also Bibi van Ginkel and others at  www.icct.nl . 
 46  See further ICRC,  International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Confl icts (Chap VI, 2011) 51. 
 Certain regimes utilise excessive antiterrorism legislation in the fi ght against 
local dissident groups and organisations, claiming that the confl ict is one between 
a legitimate government and lawless criminals and terrorists with no rights 
under International Humanitarian law. The broad and unspecifi c denunciation 
of  ‘ terrorism in all forms and manifestations ’ might contribute to legitimising 
the repression of political opponents and opposition groups, eg Kurds, Chinese 
Uighurs, Chechens, Palestinians or units under the Free Syrian Army. 45 
 The wide-reaching criminalisation of activities suited to directly or indirectly 
facilitating terrorist activities during armed confl ict might hamper operations by 
humanitarian organisations to the detriment of civilians and others who do not 
take an active part in the hostilities. The designation of an insurgent movement 
as a terrorist organisation can be used by a government to legitimise the refusal 
to permit aid workers to perform their humanitarian activities in a confl ict area. 
The Syrian government ’ s position can in this regard serve as an illustration. In the 
extreme, it could be regarded as a criminal offence under domestic law to offer 
health or social welfare services to members of a unit belonging to an organisation 
encompassing a branch responsible for terrorist acts. 
 The International Red Cross has urged that the use of the concept terrorist act 
in connection with armed confl ict should be reserved for activities covered by the 
prohibition under IHL, and that the concept otherwise should only be tied to acts 
committed outside of armed confl ict: 
 In sum, it is believed that the term  ‘ terrorist act ’ should be used, in the context of armed 
confl ict, only in relation to the few acts specifi cally designated as such under the treaties 
of International Humanitarian Law. It should not be used to describe acts that are lawful 
or not prohibited by IHL. While there is clearly an overlap in terms of the prohibition 
of attacks against civilians and civilian objects under both IHL and domestic law, it is 
believed that, overall, there are more disadvantages than advantages to additionally des-
ignating such acts as  ‘ terrorist ’ when committed in situations of armed confl ict (whether 
under the relevant international legal framework or under domestic law). Thus, with the 
exception of the few specifi c acts of terrorism that may take place in armed confl ict, it is 
submitted that the term  ‘ act of terrorism ’ should be reserved for acts of violence commit-
ted outside of armed confl ict. 46 
 Other things being equal, it might obstruct peace negotiations and reconciliation 
processes, if someone ’ s affi liation with a militant rebel group is simply regarded 
and treated as complicity in terrorism, and consequently implies the prospect of 
prosecution under domestic law. The fundamental presumption ought to be that 
activities that are not considered unlawful under International Humanitarian Law 
should not be criminalised under domestic antiterrorism legislation, including 
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 47  A number of informative Policy Briefs concerning Resolution 2178 (n 16 above), and initiatives 
prompted by various countries at  www.globalcenter.org . 
 48  See Sandra Kraehenmann,  Foreign Fighters under International Law (n 25 above) 64. 
 49  (2015) CETS 217. See also the Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol. The Protocol 
became open for signatures 21.10.2015. It has been signed by 31 Member States, and was signed by the 
EU on 22.10.2015. The Protocol ’ s entry into force requires 6 ratifi cations, including 4 Member States. It 
was ratifi ed by Denmark on 03.11.2016 and had previously been ratifi ed by Albania and Monaco. It has 
since been ratifi ed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Latvia, and the Republic of Moldova. 
 50  See the Explanatory Report at  www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter . For summaries of the Protocol, see 
 Nicola  Piacente ,  ‘ The Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Fight against Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters: The Draft Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Ter-
rorism 2005 ’  eucrim  1 / 2015 ,  12 – 15 , and  Kristian  Bartholin ,  ‘ The Additional Protocol to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism ’  eucrim ,  3/2015, 124 – 28 . On the 2005 Convention 
and Danish law, see J ø rn Vestergaard (n 5 above). 
 51  The 2005 Convention obligates participating parties to criminalise incitement, recruitment and 
training in terrorism. 
the mere joining of a rebel group. 47 The matter might be more complicated where 
an insurgent group is involved in a non-international armed confl ict and also 
bears the responsibility for terrorist acts outside the territory of the confl ict. 48 It 
is well known that ISIL is responsible for terrorist acts involving returning foreign 
 fi ghters, eg as established with regard to the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 
and in relation to several subsequent incidents. 
 VIII. The Council of Europe — Adopting 
an Additional Protocol 
 On 19 May 2015, an Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe ’ s 2005 
 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was adopted. 49 The principal aim of 
this instrument is to convey a common European implementation of the obliga-
tions stipulated in Security Council Resolution 2178. 50 The Protocol supplements 
the Convention by, inter alia, committing states to criminalising: participation 
in a terrorist organisation, receiving training for terrorism, travelling abroad or 
attempting doing so with the aim of participating in terrorism, and fi nancing, 
organising or otherwise facilitating such travelling. 51 The working group that 
 prepared the draft Protocol regarded it as inadvisable to criminalise the mere 
circumstance of  ‘ being recruited for terrorism ’ ( ‘ passive recruitment ’ ). Instead, 
the Protocol obligates contracting parties to criminalise active participation in a 
 terrorist organisation or terrorist group. No such provision exists under Danish 
law, but as previously mentioned, the Penal Code was amended in 2006 to include 
articles regarding  ‘ submitting to being recruited ’ and  ‘ submitting to being trained, 
instructed or in another manner educated ’ for the purpose of terrorism. 
 Contrary to Resolution 2178, the European Convention — and  correspondingly 
the Additional Protocol — is not applicable in case of armed forces ’ activities 
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 52  Cf the Convention Art 26 (5). See critical comments issued in common statements dated 
06.03.2015 and 7.04.2015 by Amnesty International and The International Commission of Jurists. 
The critical statements by the two organisations lead to the insertion of statements regarding respect 
for fundamental rights in the Protocol ’ s Recitals and operative Article 8. See also United Nations, 
General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/371 
(2015). 
 53  Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002/475/JHA, as amended by Framework 
 Decision 2008/919/JHA. 
 54  For a comprehensive account, see  Francesca  Galli and  Anne  Weyembergh ,  EU counter terrorism 
offences. What impact on national legislation and case law ? ( É ditions de l ’ Universit é de Bruxelles ,  2012 ) . 
 55  An excellent status on the efforts regarding  ‘ Foreign fi ghters ’ was prepared by Piotr Bakowski 
and Laura Puccio for the EU Parliament, February 2015. A useful entry by Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality, V é ra Jourov á , has been published by  eucrim 1/2015:  www.eucrim.
mpicc.de . A comprehensive evaluation of the EU ’ s antiterrorism initiatives has been conducted by the 
consortium SECILE, see  www.cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/164039_en.html ; see also the summation at 
 www.statswatch.org . 
 56  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terror-
ism and replacing Council framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism 2015/0281, 
COM(2015) 625 fi nal, 02.12.2015. After nearly one and a half year ’ s negotiating, Directive (EU) 
2017/541 entered into force on 20.04.2017, see [2017] OJ L88, pp 6 – 21. 
during armed confl ict. This is paradoxical, since it is the confl ict in Syria and Iraq 
which is the immediate cause for composing the Protocol. 52 
 IX. The European Union — Proposing 
a New Directive 
 After 9/11, the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism was adopted. 53 The 
Member States agreed to criminalise acts of terrorism and certain preparatory 
offences, including fi nancing and other forms of facilitating terrorism. Prompted 
by the adoption of the Council of Europe 2005 Convention, the Framework 
 Decision was amended in 2008 to also cover recruiting, training and public provo-
cation for terrorism. 54 
 In view of Security Council Resolution 2178, the Council of Ministers decided 
to explore the need for expanding the Member States ’ obligations to cover even 
earlier stages of preparatory activities. The Paris attacks on 7 January 2015 gave 
further cause for reinforcing the available measures in the prevention of extrem-
ism and radicalisation, etc. 55 
 In light of incidents culminating in the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, 
the Commission presented a proposal for a new directive to replace the existing 
Framework Decision. 56 The proposal specifi cally targeted the problem concerning 
foreign terrorist fi ghters. Its eventual adoption will pave the way for ratifi cation of 
the Additional Protocol to the European 2005 Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism, which the EU signed in October 2015. 
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 57  See for example an opinion from the Parliament ’ s Economic and Social Committee, EUT 
C177/51. See also Meijers Committee,  Note on a Proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism (2016). 
On 09.03.2016, a majority decision was taken by the British Parliament not to opt-in on the proposed 
directive. 
 58  See suggested amendment to Recital 8 and operative Articles 3(2)(i) and 9 of the draft Directive, 
Report of 12.07.2016, Committee on Civil Liberties, Home and Justice Affairs, A8-0228/2016. Such a 
requirement has been inserted in Recitals 8 and 17 of the Directive. 
 59  See suggested amendments to Recital 7 and operative Article 5 of the draft Directive, ibid. Such a 
requirement has been stipulated in Recital 10 of the Directive. 
 60  See the suggested amendment of a new Recital 17c to the draft Directive, ibid. A dedication to a 
comprehensive prevention approach has been stated in Recital 31 to the Directive with a reference to 
inter alia the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism of 2014. 
 61  Regarding the addition of a proposed Recital 19a, see the Council ’ s documents  ‘ Examination of 
the Revised text ’ of 12.02.2016 and 23.02.2016,  ‘ General approach ’ of 03.03.2016, and  ‘ [E]xchange of 
views on the LIBE orientation vote ’ of 15.07.2016. The caveat has been established in Recital 37 of the 
Directive. 
 62  SOU 2016:40 on criminal law measures against participation in an armed confl ict for the support 
of a terrorist organisation ( ‘ Straffr ä ttsliga  å tg ä rder mot deltagande i en v ä pnad konfl ikt till st ö d f ö r en 
terroristorganisation ’ ). It is observed in the report that the application for this kind of excuse will be 
rather limited. 
 The Directive proposal inter alia included offences regarding receiving training 
for terrorism and also dealt with travelling and facilitation, including cross-border 
travelling within the EU. In addition, the Commission proposed widening of the 
rules concerning criminal attempt and participation as well as of the rules regard-
ing jurisdiction. Various actors criticised the proposal for imposing extraordinar-
ily wide-reaching obligations without offering the necessary guarantees regarding 
fundamental rights. 57 
 With regard to the Commission ’ s quest to criminalise travelling abroad for ter-
rorist purposes, it appeared adequate to agree with at least a number of the LIBE 
Committee ’ s suggestions. Thus, the Committee advocated that such activities 
should only be criminalised when the terrorist purpose of the travel is proven by 
inferring from  ‘ objective, factual circumstances ’ . 58 Likewise, the Committee ’ s sug-
gestion that public provocation by, inter alia, glorifi cation or justifi cation, should 
be criminalised only when it causes a danger  ‘ in a concrete case ’ that a terrorist 
offence may be committed, seemed sensible. 59 
 The LIBE Committee also pointed to the importance of providing effective 
 de-radicalisation and exit programmes. 60 
 Originally, the proposal did not repeat the caveat included in the Framework 
Decision Recital 11, modifying its scope of application by excluding armed 
forces activities during armed confl ict. Subsequently, this shortcoming has been 
 remedied. 61 Member States will keep a certain margin of appreciation, under 
which they may exclude certain activities conducted during an armed confl ict 
and not violating IHL. Proposed new antiterrorism legislation under Swedish law 
includes a caveat exempting its application with regard to situations during which 
an organisation participating in armed confl ict does not violate International 
Humanitarian Law. 62 
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 63  The Additional Protocol 2015 to the European Convention 2005 (n 16 above) does not require 
states to introduce such schemes. In a statement of 17.10.2014, the Norwegian Attorney General sug-
gested introducing legislation authorising the Government to designate certain armed confl icts in 
order to forbid Norwegian citizens and foreigners living in Norway to join a party in the confl ict. 
 64  Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 , Sections 119.2 and 119.3. 
 Due to the Danish reservation regarding JHA matters, the adoption of the 
Proposal will not be binding upon Denmark as a Member State. The Framework 
Decision will remain in force with respect to Denmark. Largely, it can be assumed 
that Danish law is already compatible with the obligations enumerated in the pro-
posed directive. 
 X. Introducing a Ban on Travelling 
to and Remaining in Confl ict Zones 
 In late 2014, Centre-Right politicians in Denmark called for initiatives to crimi-
nalise travelling to and staying in certain confl ict zones. The demand for such leg-
islation was driven by right-wing opposition parties, but the Government, which 
was at that time headed by Social Democrats, responded reluctantly. Inspiration 
came from new legislation recently enacted in Australia with the aim of targeting 
foreign fi ghters before departure and after return by setting up special provisions 
allowing overseas confl ict zones to be declared as no-go zones. 63 
 Under Australian law, a new offence criminalises travel to any area designated 
as a no-go zone by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the grounds that a terrorist 
organisation operates within this area. The broad designation power allows the 
prescription of entire countries, or regions spanning two or more countries. The 
offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years ’ imprisonment. An exhaustive list 
of specifi c defences is included in the legislation, and covers situations where a 
person ’ s reason for visiting the designated area can be considered as a  ‘ legitimate 
purpose ’ such as bona fi de visits to family members, performing humanitarian aid 
work, or undertaking offi cial or journalistic duties. The discretion of the judici-
ary to consider an accused person ’ s legitimate purposes for travel is limited, and 
the onus to satisfy the evidential burden that travel was for a legitimate purpose 
rests with the suspect. Individuals who return to Australia accused on reasonable 
grounds of engaging in  ‘ hostile activities ’ overseas can be subjected to control 
orders, if a court is satisfi ed that the controls are  ‘ reasonably necessary and rea-
sonably appropriate and adapted for the purpose of protecting the public from a 
terrorist act ’ . These control orders can foresee measures such as overnight curfews, 
reporting requirements and substantial phone and internet restrictions. Until 
recently, Australia was the sole country where such legislation had been adopted. 64 
So far, Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq have been designated as  declared areas . 
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 65  The Permanent Penal Committee ’ s report 1559, 2016 on armed confl icts abroad ( ‘ Straffelovr å-
 dets bet æ nkning om v æ bnede konfl ikter i udlandet ’ ). 
 The Danish Permanent Penal Committee was requested to analyse if further 
criminalisation under Danish law was needed, especially whether some sort of 
prohibition on travel to confl ict zones should be enacted. In early 2016, the Com-
mittee delivered a report regarding criminalising participation in an armed confl ict 
abroad, irrespective of whether Denmark is involved in the particular situation. 65 
As a general understanding, the Committee stated that Danish law fully complies 
with the requirements of Security Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol to 
the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, implying 
that none of these documents motivates amendments to the Penal Code. Further-
more, the Committee found no cause for introducing a separate article in order 
to criminalise travelling abroad for the purpose of being involved in terrorism, 
since such preparatory activities would already be punishable as inchoate or pre-
paratory offences under the Penal Code ’ s general and very broad rules regarding 
criminal attempt and participation. 
 Basically, the Committee considered criminalising the mere entry into or 
remaining in a confl ict zone to be an excessive measure, irrespective of the par-
ticular modality of such a possible regulation and its corresponding exemptions. 
The Committee considered that such a ban means that a person will be punishable 
for activities that do not necessarily imply any substantiated risk of violence or any 
proven adverse impact. The fundamental dilemma is that such a regulation would 
either be so strict that it curtails some objectively legitimate travelling to and resid-
ing in certain areas or it would allow for such broad exceptions that no added 
value to existing prohibitions is achieved. There is a risk that a ban in some cases 
will affl ict ordinary law-abiding citizens instead of individuals aiming to join an 
armed group. Basically, the Committee questioned whether the benefi ts of such an 
injunction are reasonably proportional to the inconveniences affecting individu-
als ’ freedom of movement and the increase in red tape. 
 Furthermore, the Committee found it unlikely that a ban on travelling and 
remaining in confl ict zones is suited to preventing participation in armed confl ict 
abroad. Courts can be expected to assess the seriousness of an unqualifi ed viola-
tion of a travel ban by entering or remaining in a no-go zone without a proper 
permit from the Danish authorities as relatively light. Even with a statutory sen-
tencing maximum of six years ’ imprisonment, the penalty in specifi c instances will 
be much more lenient than in cases regarding terrorism or treason, typically a fi ne 
or a short prison term. Individuals with a strong commitment to the cause they 
want to fi ght for are not likely to be deterred by the risk of punishment, in particu-
lar as the sanction inevitably must be more lenient than the penalty for actually 
unlawfully joining an armed force. In many instances, it will even be diffi cult to 
prove violations, no matter how the regulation is constructed. 
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 66  The introduction of a new provision in PC Section 114 j was enacted by Parliament ’ s Act 642, 
2016. Violation is punishable by imprisonment up to 6 years. In addition, the maximum penalty for 
recruitment to or facilitation of terrorism was increased from 6 years ’ to 10 years ’ imprisonment and 
increased to 16 years ’ imprisonment if the person has participated in armed combat. Under newly 
enacted Swedish law, the ordinary maximum for such an offence is imprisonment up to 2 years; if the 
crime is serious, a sentence of imprisonment for at least 6 months and at most 6 years may be imposed. 
 67  On the basis of consultations with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence, the Minister 
of Justice can designate a particular area where a terrorist group is involved in armed confl ict. 
 68  Travel and stay in a designated area by Danish, foreign or international public servants may take 
place without prior authorisation. 
 Dutifully, the Penal Committee indicated various possible schemes, but basi-
cally did not fi nd any such kind of prohibition recommendable. In the light of 
the Committee ’ s fundamental disclaimers, it chose to abstain from advocating 
one particular mode of possible prohibition, and instead it drew up a number of 
varying modalities supplemented by a description of their distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. 
 Despite the Committee ’ s reservations, the Minister of Justice, Mr S ø ren Pind, 
decided to present a draft Bill containing a proposal to insert an article in the Penal 
Code by which the Minister would be authorised to designate a particular geo-
graphical area as a no-go zone. During the very busy closing session immediately 
before Parliament ’ s summer recess, the Minister ’ s Bill to that effect was passed 
without much attention or debate. 66 The meek reservations voiced by a minority 
of politicians concerned with civil liberties resulted only in a superfl uous amend-
ment allowing Parliament to revoke a specifi c decision by the Minister of Justice 
regarding the designation of a certain area as affected by a travel ban. 
 The Minister ’ s draft proposal was presented on the very same day that the Com-
mittee ’ s 256-page report was published. Because of the timing, there was scant 
opportunity for other politicians and the public to familiarise themselves with 
the Committee ’ s analysis and reservations, let alone time for sober refl ection. In 
addition, it was not very tempting for any politician to object, considering the fact 
that just the previous day vast media attention had been devoted to the swift arrest 
of a number of individuals accused of having travelled to Syria as foreign fi ghters 
at one or other point in time. The draft proposal immediately gained univocal 
political support. 
 The mentioned police action resulted in the arrest of a total of nine persons, fi ve 
of these  in absentia , the others incarcerated in pre-trial detention. The preliminary 
hearings were held  in camera , so public information regarding the charges was 
minimal. However, it might be considered a paradox that a proposal for extended 
restrictions was promoted at the exact same time that provisions already in exist-
ence were demonstrated to obviously serve their purpose rather effectively. The 
outcome of one of the cases will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
 According to the new rules, travelling to and residing in a designated area where 
a terrorist group is a party in an armed confl ict requires prior permission. 67 Upon 
application, a permit may be issued provided that the purpose of the journey or 
stay is considered suffi ciently proper. 68 A licence can be issued not only to certain 
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 69  The Government expects to be issuing an administrative Regulation in the course of September 
2016 regarding the implementation of the travel restrictions. When media coverage appeared in the 
summer of 2016 regarding an apparent increase in the frequency of young women travelling to Syria, it 
was criticised that the law was not expediently implemented already when the new article was enacted 
in early June. 
 70  Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Riga October 2015), paras 47 – 48. Art 4 of the Protocol provides the legal frame-
work for facilitating the implementation of a ban on travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism as 
required by Security Council Resolution 2178 (n 16 above), Para 6(a). 
individuals but also to collectives of persons due to their affi liation to a particular 
business or organisation, eg a media enterprise. 
 Criminal liability requires merely that the concerned individual has travelled to 
or stayed in a prescribed no-go zone without relevant permission. It is not nec-
essary to prove that the person in question has violated any other prohibition, 
eg antiterrorism provisions or the treason article. 
 The application procedure is going to be cumbersome, and errors can hardly be 
avoided in the administrative assessment of the legitimacy of the travel purpose. 69 
The potential for innocent people to be affected is imminent, and as no particular 
procedural relief regarding access to judicial review has been granted, the likeli-
hood that objectively wrong estimates will be corrected by court review is slim. 
The article is likely to have the chilling effect of discouraging people from travel-
ling to designated areas, even when they wish to do so for innocuous reasons and 
have no intention of participating in foreign confl icts. 
 Fundamentally, a general requirement for preapproval of travelling to or stay-
ing in a particular area abroad raises concerns regarding certain human rights. 
Article 2 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR as well as Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allow only for narrow exceptions with 
regard to the right to travel. In the explanatory memorandum to the Additional 
Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, it 
is emphasised that said article is only concerned with criminalisation of travelling 
 ‘ under very particular conditions ’ . The memo goes on by adding the following 
accentuation: 
 That these conditions are met in a concrete case must be proven  … through evidence 
submitted to an independent court for scrutiny  … 
 In order for a Party to criminalise behaviour under Article 4 of the Protocol  … the real 
purpose of the travel must be for the perpetrator to commit or participate in terrorist 
offences, or to receive or provide training for terrorism  … 70 
 Thus, it is questionable whether the courts in Denmark or the Strasbourg court 
would consider the application of a general travel ban to be compatible with 
ECHR requirements. 
 The author of this chapter pointed this potential problem out to the Ministry of 
Justice during the hearing process before the fi nal adoption of the proposed Bill. 
The Ministry ’ s reply was a blank and not very meaningful reference to a general 
statement that the measure is motivated by important societal interests, ie national 
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 71  Ministry of Justice brief 04.05.2016. 
security, public safety and prevention of crime, and that the legislation is therefore 
not disproportionate with regard to its stated purpose. 71 
 XI. The First Conviction by Danish Courts 
of a Syrian-Traveller 
 Due to a perceived lack of suffi cient evidence against suspected foreign fi ghters 
returning from Syria, the Danish prosecution service did not until very recently 
become able to produce an indictment concerning violation of antiterrorism 
 legislation, etc. 
 Formally, the Danish Minister of Justice is in charge of public prosecution. In 
principle, this implies that the Minister is vested with the power to issue instruc-
tions to the Director of Public Prosecutions ( Rigsadvokaten ), even regarding the 
specifi c handling of concrete cases. Traditionally, this authority is exercised with 
considerable restraint, meaning that the Minister in offi ce does not normally 
interfere in decisions as to whether or not someone should be indicted in a par-
ticular instance. Thus, despite continuous public pressure from the political right, 
previous Social Democratic justice ministers persistently maintained as a matter 
of principle that such decisions ought to be left to the professional discretion prac-
tised by the prosecutorial system. 
 In the summer of 2015, the previously mentioned change in Government gen-
erated a new approach to the issue of enforcing provisions regarding terrorism, 
etc, and the situation was then altered signifi cantly. Now, the newly appointed 
Minister of Justice, Mr S ø ren Pind, set a revised agenda for implementing criminal 
justice measures in the fi ght against terrorism. In his former opposition days, he 
had been one of the very outspoken and impatient advocates for a more rigorous 
mode of suppressing activities related to terrorism. As previously mentioned, he 
had vigorously acted as one of the leading partisans for the fi rm position that affi l-
iation with an adversary armed force during an armed confl ict involving  Denmark 
must be severely punishable as an act of treason, and after taking offi ce, he pro-
moted the new legislation to that effect and concerning no-go zones. 
 Now, a special task force was established under the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions. The purpose of this initiative was to pinpoint cases suited for indictment 
for perpetration of offences related to terrorism. This effort entailed a signifi cant 
momentum to a determined push in the investigation and screening of potential 
court cases and the judicial enforcement of the criminal law. Consequently, several 
individuals were charged under various criminal provisions, including facilitation 
of terrorism by affi liation with ISIL, public glorifi cation of terrorism, etc. 
 Additional fuel to further prosecutorial initiatives materialised when data fi les 
containing systematic membership information registered by ISIL were published. 
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 72  Mid-2016, an additional six individuals were still under pre-trial custody under suspicion of 
having been recruited for terrorism. 
 73  Judgment by Glostrup Municipal Court, 24.06.2016, case no 15-570/2016. 
The materials emerged in March 2016 when a renegade affi liate of ISIL delivered a 
USB-device storing confi dential records to Sky-News. The documents held forms 
completed with personal details regarding more than 1,700 individuals from a 
large number of countries, including at least 12 jihadists from Denmark, accord-
ing to media accounts. Consequently, a more solid foundation had materialised 
for building cases against persons suspected of having submitted themselves to 
being recruited by ISIL. As already mentioned, recruiting as well as the act of being 
recruited for terrorism became criminal offences under Danish law as early as 
2006. However, no part of the provision to that effect had until recently been in 
use in a criminal case. 
 The relevant parts of the leaked ISIL materials were to be incorporated into the 
evidence against a 23-year old Turkish-Danish male, who back in December 2015 
had been charged with violations of antiterrorism provisions, including by letting 
himself be recruited by ISIL. 72 According to the indictment, he had at one time 
been to Syria, where he joined ISIL, and he was furthermore suspected of planning 
another similar trip, which was averted when he was arrested in March 2015. His 
passport was then confi scated. In addition, the police seized 20,000 DKK, which he 
allegedly intended to bring along to Syria and donate to ISIL, and for this, he was 
also indicted for attempted fi nancing of terrorism. 
 According to the court record, the defendant had made a fi rst fl ight trip to 
Istanbul in July 2013. 73 From there he went to Kilis and took a taxi to the Syrian 
border where he met a contact person who smuggled the defendant and others 
into Syria. They were then picked up in cars by someone from ISIL. After a couple 
of days, the defendant started working, but a short time afterwards he decided to 
leave, and he then travelled back to Turkey. 
 In August 2013, he once again went on a similar journey to Syria. He was 
accepted by ISIL and took up work, for which he was paid  $ 300 – 400 per month. 
He testifi ed in court that he had been employed in a bakery and that he delivered 
food to people and cooked for those that he lived with. He maintained that he did 
not receive training in arms usage. 
 On arrival the second time he took part in the completion of a formula designed 
for registering personal data. An exhibit presented in court revealed that he had 
been indexed as  ‘ fi ghter ’ , and that an equal capacity had been attributed to him in a 
box regarding the person ’ s speciality. Concerning this information, the defendant 
explained that there had simply not been a more adequate option, as the selection 
of answering choices only covered  ‘ martyr ’ ,  ‘ bomb belt-bearer ’ and  ‘ fi ghter ’ . 
 Among the defendant ’ s belongings, the police had recovered a photo of him 
in front of an ISIL banner where he was posing with AK47-rifl es and the text 
 ‘ Abu Aya Al-Kurdi ’ and  ‘ No honour without Jihad ’ . He insisted that he had solely 
wanted to brag. 
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 74  Regarding the fi rst trip to Syria, one of the six jurors did not fi nd suffi cient evidence that the 
defendant had received weapons training, but this juror concurred as far as the main indictment 
regarding training for terrorism was concerned. One juror voted for acquittal with regard to fi nancing 
of terrorism. 
 75  In early 2016, a young man was sentenced to 6 months ’ imprisonment for violation of PC Section 
136 (1) by posting a link on Facebook to a video-recording of a speech by a representative for ISIL who 
prompted attacks and killings on citizens from the coalition fi ghting ISIL. Furthermore, the defendant 
was convicted for violation of PC Section 136 (2) by glorifying he attack on Charlie Hebdo. The judg-
ment is recorded in U 2016.1743  Ø . 
 76  Judgment by the Eastern High Court, 31.03.2017, case no S-1922-2016. 
 77  Permission regarding third instance appellate review granted by the Appeals Permissions Board 
(Procesbevillingsn æ vnet), 08.06.2017, case no 2017-25-0100. 
 The Municipal court rejected the defendant ’ s allegations regarding his work 
activities as incoherent, muddled and illogical. Consequently, the court found him 
guilty of joining ISIL and of receiving weapons training. Further, the defendant 
was found guilty as charged with regard to the fi nancing of terrorism. 74 
 In addition, the defendant was convicted of glorifying terrorism. 75 In a 
 Facebook-group entitled  ‘ Allah knows best ’ including 17,000 followers, he had 
posted edited video footage showing a hearse bearing the coffi n at the funeral 
service for Omar El-Hussein, the young Muslim responsible for the Copenhagen 
shootings in February 2015. The defendant was deemed responsible for the text: 
 ‘ Wallah this man has shaken Denmark MashAllah. And support your brother. May 
we in shaa Allah have more brothers like Omar. Who sacrifi ced his life for Allah 
and his prophet ’ . 
 The judges and jurors in the Municipal court unanimously voted for sentencing 
the defendant to seven years ’ imprisonment, which was actually one year more 
than called for by the prosecutor. Due to the defendant ’ s lack of relations with 
Turkish society, the court decided not to deprive him of his Danish citizenship. 
 On appellate review, the Eastern High Court upheld the conviction and com-
plied with the prosecutor ’ s plea for revocation of citizenship and for banishment, 
but lowered the sentence to six years ’ imprisonment. 76 The defendant has since 
been granted leave for partial appellate review of the sanctions issues, and the case 
is currently pending before the Supreme Court. 77 
 Another six individuals are currently held in pre-trial custody on suspicion 
of associating with ISIL as foreign fi ghters. Other suspects have been arrested 
 in absentia . 
 XII. Looking Back — Looking Forward 
 The trouble with restraining the fl ow of more or less radicalised individuals 
 travelling abroad to join terrorist groups and organisations and with bringing 
foreign fi ghters to justice has not been rooted in a lack of adequate penal provi-
sions. Largely, criminal legislation to that effect has been plentiful all along, at least 
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under Danish law. Moreover, the Passport Code and the Foreigners Act have been 
amended in order to require authorisation for outward passage by individuals 
under suspicion of being potential foreign fi ghters. The recently introduced pro-
visions regarding no-go confl ict zones have completed the criminal law response. 
Furthermore, both national rules and EU rules on security agencies ’ access to 
PNR information regarding passengers have been enacted. In addition, the 
Danish Military Intelligence Service has been authorised to conduct surveillance 
and interception of Danish citizens abroad outside the country.  Ceteris paribus , 
the challenge of detecting, investigating and prosecuting perpetrators violating 
antiterrorism provisions or committing other more or less serious crimes while 
associated with militant or terrorist groups is met by rather comprehensive legisla-
tion. Obviously, however, the application of criminal justice measures and other 
forms of restraining or repressive tools offers no effi cient deterrent or guarantee 
for an adequate justice response and thus cannot be the only or defi nitive answer 
to the challenges presented by foreign fi ghters. 
 All accessible information clearly indicates that radicalised individuals who are 
aroused and committed to their cause do not respond to threats of punishment 
but are in fact willing and ready to burn bridges to ordinary everyday life and 
even risk their lives in dauntless pursue of excitement, affi rmation of individual 
identity, commitment to a cause, etc. Neither legislation nor other measures can 
close all loopholes for the most persistent and energetic individuals, who relatively 
easily may fi nd travel routes and be able to keep under the radar. 
 Furthermore, a rigid law enforcement scheme is counterproductive, since it 
contributes to undermining the opportunity to address lost souls who only tem-
porarily have gone astray and to bring them back to ordinary society. In less serious 
instances and in cases where prosecution is not an option, diversion alternatives 
aiming at reintegration should be available as an alternative to imprisonment, 
especially considering the risk of further radicalisation when serving a prison 
term. In addition, an individual stigmatised as a foreign fi ghter facing criminal 
trial after returning will have less incentive to come back at all and less motivation 
to comply with the law of armed confl ict. 
 It is of the utmost importance to strike a just and adequate balance between 
an ever-more expanding criminal justice response to the threat of terrorism 
and a social welfare reintegration approach to the prevention of various activi-
ties by foreign fi ghters. The value and importance of developing and  prioritising 
de- radicalisation and exit programmes deserves further consideration and 
exploration. 
 From a civil rights perspective, the categorical drive by national politicians to 
apply criminal justice measures and other repressive remedies indiscriminately 
in order to cope with returning foreign terrorist fi ghters as understood in a very 
broad sense is worrying. At least in instances where there is no compelling evi-
dence that the individual in question has personally been directly involved in 
terrorism or other types of international crimes, the wiser approach is the one 
represented by the Aarhus rehabilitation model and like schemes. 
 
